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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Thomas Peterson appeals from three cases which were presided over by two 
different district court judges. However, all three cases are interrelated, as each 
subsequent charge also constitutes a probation violation of the preceding case(s). With 
the final charge, all three sentences were executed. Mr. Peterson asserts that the 
district court, which revoked his probation in the first two cases, abused its discretion by 
revoking that probation, or alternatively, by not reducing his sentences sua sponte when 
it did so. He also asserts that it abused its discretion by denying his subsequent 
motions for reconsideration pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) in those cases. 
IVlr. Peterson also asserts that, in the newest case, the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion in that case. 
Most importantly, however, is the fact that the district courts appear to have 
misplaced part of the records they considered: the telephone records which formed the 
evidentiary basis upon which the newest charge was based. The district court in the 
newest case expressly considered that evidence, which it asserted was attached to the 
PSI. The other district court stated that it considered all the information attached to the 
PSI prepared for the district court in the newest case. The fact that the whereabouts of 
those documents is currently unknown, which has resulted in the inability to include 
them in the appellate record, constitutes a violation of Mr. Peterson's state and federal 
constitutional due process rights. 
This Court should remedy those abuses. 
1 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
There are three cases at issue in this appeal. 1 Mr. Peterson is currently serving 
time on three sentences, each for a violation of a No Contact Order (hereinafter, NCO). 
(R., Vol.1, pp.316-18; R., Vol.2, pp.55-57.)2 Specifically, those sentences are a 
five-year unified sentence, with three years fixed (R., Vol.1, pp.60-62); a concurrent 
unified five-year sentence, with three and one-half years fixed. (R., Vol.1, p.259-64); 
and a consecutive unified sentence of five years, with one and one-half years fixed. 
(R., Vol.2, pp.56.) 
Mr. Peterson has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder 
(hereinafter, PTSD), as well as a cognitive memory disorder secondary to a brain 
1 Docket Number 39146 (CR-08-17740) and Docket Number 39147 (CR-10-10642) 
were consolidated by Supreme Court order on November 22, 2011. 
On February 10, 2012, Mr. Peterson filed a notice of appeal in CR-11-3748 
challenging the sentence imposed in that case. (R., Vol.2, pp.65-67.) The resulting 
appeal, Docket Number 39679, was dismissed by the Supreme Court as untimely. He 
filed another Notice of Appeal in CR-11-3748 on March 9, 2012, challenging the district 
court's denial of his subsequently-filed motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35). (R., Vol.2, pp.74-76.) That appeal is addressed in Docket 
Number 39783. As the independent charge in that case was also alleged as a probation 
violation in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147, the issues to be presented were 
significantly similar, and therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court ordered all three cases 
consolidated on July 11, 2012. 
Therefore, Mr. Peterson has filed a contemporaneous motion requesting that this 
Court take judicial notice of the record from Supreme Court Docket Number 39679 
pursuant to I.AR. 32(c) and I.R.E. 201. The documents therein are relevant to 
understanding the procedural history of Mr. Peterson's case and the facts therein are 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot be reasonably questioned - the records maintained by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
2 There are two independently-paginated volumes containing the clerk's records. For 
purposes of clarity, "R., Vol. 1" will refer to the record prepared for Docket Numbers 
39146 and 39147. "R., Vol.2" will refer to the record prepared for Docket Number 
39783. 
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injury, 3 and anti-social personality disorder. ( See, e.g., Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), Vol. 1, pp.339, 448-57 (letter and report from Dr. Jason Gage 
confirming those diagnoses).)4 He has been found to be fully disabled as a result of 
these conditions, making him eligible for social security and Medicaid funding. 
(See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, pp.344-49.) Even before these issues developed, Mr. Peterson's 
life was not easy, as he was physically abused by a step-father (see, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, 
p.446), and suffered from either Attention Deficit Disorder (hereinafter, ADD) or 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (hereinafter, ADHD). (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, 
3 That injury, the product of a motorcycle accident in 2005, also affects Mr. Peterson 
physically, as it has caused him to develop a seizure disorder. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, 
p.410; PSI, Vol.2, p.454.) In addition, the accident did severe damage to his leg, 
leaving him in chronic pain and limited weight-bearing ability in that leg, which in turn, 
limits his mobility. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.162.) He had, however, healed sufficiently 
for doctors to remove the hardware (such as the screws) which had been implanted 
during his initial treatment. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, pp.292-98 (Dr. Erik Heggland's report 
of the procedure to remove the hardware).) 
4 Both district courts received an updated PSI to advise them on their respective 2011 
decisions. For purposes of clarity, the PSI prepared for prepared for Docket Nos. 39146 
and 39147 will be referred to as "PSI, Vol.1," and page references herein will 
correspond with the page numbers electronic PDF file "PetersonPSl.pdf" contained on 
the CD-ROM bearing Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147. The PSI prepared for Docket 
No. 39783 will be referred to as "PSI, Vol.2," and page references herein will 
correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file "PetersonPSl.pdf" 
contained on the CD-ROM bearing Docket Number 39783. 
The two PSls appear to contain much of the same information (which includes 
various PSls, medical information and evaluations, police reports, etc.), although there 
are some case-specific documents, such as the relevant charging Information 
documents or relevant court minutes. (Compare, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.314 with PSI, Vol.2, 
p.232-35.) This is consistent with the information in the record, which indicates that the 
district court in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147 used the PSI information prepared in 
Docket Number 39783. (Tr., Vol.1, p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.4 ("I also have the 
Department of Correction updates on the file and the updated presentence report 
prepared for [Docket Number 39783] and the attached materials related to those 
presentence materials").) However, the information appears to have been scanned into 
the electronic file in a different order. PSI, Vol.1 also has two sections where two pages 
from the hard copy of the PSI are contained on one digital page. Additionally, there are 
also multiple copies of several documents in both PSls (for example, each contains at 
least five copies of the police reports relating to the 3rd violation of the NCO (the 
investigation which also addressed the vandalized vehicle)). 
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pp.132, 481.) Regardless, he was able to earn his GED in 2001. (PSI, Vol.2, p. 533.) 
Furthermore, he has been able to remain employed with the same company since 2008 
despite his current disabilities, and he is eligible to return to work there upon his 
eventual release. 5 (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.9.) His employers submitted letters of 
support to the district courts on Mr. Peterson's behalf. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, pp.428-29, 
534.) In addition, he has ongoing support from other members of his community.6 
(See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, pp.432, 481, 483.) And, evidencing his progress while on 
probation, he was able to maintain a clean and sober residence, to continue his 
employment, and to attend treatment programs during that time. (PSI, Vol.1, p.72.) 
The NCO appears to have arisen from Mr. Peterson's conviction of domestic 
assault in 2007. (See PSI, Vol.1, p.405.) The "victim" of the NCO violation in these 
cases, Dorene Giannini, had been trying to get the district court to lift a No Contact 
Order (hereinafter, NCO) before any of these charges arose (see, e.g. PSI, Vol.2, 
p.23), as it prevented Mr. Peterson (her fiancee at that time) from having contact with 
her. (Tr., Vol.1, p.6, Ls.14-17, p.7, Ls.8-10.)7 Mr. Peterson, a recovering alcoholic, 
5 According to the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter, ALJ) who resolved 
Mr. Peterson's social security claim, this did not constitute "gainful employment" 
because his employer was understanding of his condition, and as such, gave 
Mr. Peterson a lot of leeway in the workplace. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.347.) 
6 He has also been able to reclaim his relationship with his daughter and is working to 
do so with his son. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, pp.8, 11.) 
7 The transcripts for the hearings in the cases now on appeal are contained in five 
independently-paginated volumes. For purposes of clarity, "Tr., Vol.1" will refer to the 
volume containing the February 19, 2009, sentencing hearing, the August 19, 2010, 
entry of guilty plea hearing, the September 30, 2010, sentencing hearing, and the 
September 1, 2011, sentencing hearing. "Tr., Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing 
the January 8, 2009, change of plea hearing. "Tr., Vol.3" will refer to the December 10, 
2009, admit-deny and deposition hearing, which, on May 4, 2012, the Supreme Court 
ordered to be augmented to the record. "Tr., Vol.4" will refer to the volume containing 
the June 16, 2011, admit-deny hearing. And "Tr., Vol.5'' will refer to the volume 
containing the May 20, 2011, plea hearing and the September 14, 2011 sentencing 
hearing. 
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began experiencing a relapse and, recognizing the symptoms, called her for support 
after being unable to reach his sponsorer. (Tr., Vol.1, p.13, L.11 - p.14, L.1, p.19, Ls.2-
4.) The telephonic contact was allowed pursuant to the NCO at that time. (See, 
R., Vol.1, pp.101-02.) However, in her effort to support Mr. Peterson and help him 
prevent a relapse, Ms. Giannini took him to get some dinner and on some 
errands. (Tr., Vol.2, Ls.18 - p.21, L.5.) As a result of that contact, the State charged 
Mr. Peterson in Docket Number 39146 with violating the NCO, as well as giving false 
information. (See, e.g., R., Vol.1, pp.36-37.) Mr. Peterson pied guilty to violating the 
NCO and, in exchange, the State dismissed the false information charge. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.5, Ls.20-21.) It also agreed to not file a persistent violator enhancement and to 
recommend a five-year unified sentence, subject to a period of retained jurisdiction.8 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.2.) The district court ultimately imposed a five-year unified 
sentence, with three years fixed, and it retained jurisdiction. (R., Vol.1, pp.60-62.) 
Upon review of his successful performance in the rider program, the district court 
suspended his sentence for a five-year period of probation. (R., Vol.1, pp.69-74.) 
Conditions 21 and 22 of that probation addressed the on-going restrictions of 
Mr. Peterson's ability to contact Ms. Giannini. (R., Vol.1, p. 72.) 
However, there was some confusion between Mr. Peterson and his probation 
officer in regard to those conditions, which resulted in a motion for probation violation. 
(R., Vol.1, pp.91-92.) Mr. Peterson erroneously believed that when the underlying 
NCOs had been lifted, 9 he was free to contact Ms. Giannini, but did not recognize 
8 There record indicates that Mr. Peterson had violated this NCO two times prior to this 
instance. (See PSI, Vol.1, p.405.) 
9 One was quashed on March 18, 2009, by court order. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.45.) 
A second NCO regarding Ms. Giannini from a different case was quashed on March 19, 
5 
that his probation officer could still order him not to have contact with her if he saw fit 
to do so. (Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.23 - p.2, L.8.) Otherwise, Mr. Peterson had been doing well 
on probation. (Tr., Vol.3, p.1, Ls.15-17, p.2, L.19.) Once the parties clarified the 
misunderstanding, they agreed to offer a joint recommendation that Mr. Peterson be 
reinstated on probation, but with a clear and formal NCO which forbade all contact but 
telephonic contact between himself and Ms. Giannini until such time that he received 
written permission from his probation officer to reinitiate contact, and that the existing 
NCO be quashed. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.23.) That NCO was entered by the 
district court. (R., Vol.1, p.101; Tr., p.21, Ls.12-18.) 
Both Mr. Peterson and Ms. Giannini subsequently moved to quash that new NCO 
in February 2010. (R., Vol.1, pp.106-07.) Mr. Peterson's probation officer objected and 
the district court ordered the NCO to continue until the probation officer was satisfied. 10 
(R., Vol.1, pp.111-12.) Subsequently, new charges, alleging more violations of the NCO 
were filed by the State in Docket Number 39147. 11 It also filed a new motion for 
probation violation in Docket Number 39146 based on the same underlying events. 
(R., Vol.1, pp.129-30, 241.) Specifically, Mr. Peterson was waiting near Ms. Giannini's 
house, attempting to get the license plate number of the person he believed had begun 
dealing methamphetamine to Ms. Giannini (and as a result, caused Mr. Peterson's 
probation officer to continue to object to quashing the NCO), which he intended to 
2009, by court order. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.56.) The subsequent motion for 
probation violation was filed on November 22, 2009. (R., Vol.1, pp.91-92.) 
10 Mr. Peterson moved to quash the NCO a second time, but when the district court 
reiterated its position in regard to the probation officer's approval, defense counsel 
indicated that Mr. Peterson did not wish to pursue the issue further, although 
Mr. Peterson was not present at that hearing. (R., Vol.1, pp.113-16.) 
11 The State additionally filed an Information, Part II, in Docket Number 39147, which 
alleged a new persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.248-50.) 
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forward to the authorities. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.158.) The district 
court subsequently granted a motion to consolidate those two cases. (R., Vol.1, 
pp.137, 252.) 
Mr. Peterson agreed to plead guilty to the charges of violating the NCO, as well 
as admit the accompanying probation violations, and in exchange, the State agreed to 
not pursue the persistent violator enhancement and to limit its recommendation to a 
unified term of five years, with one year fixed. (Tr., Vol.1, p.29, L.14 - p.30, L.4.) 
Mr. Peterson also informed the district court that he was under the care of Dr. Jason 
Gage for his brain injury and seizure disorder, and that Dr. Gage had confirmed the 
diagnoses of PTSD, cognitive disorder, and anti-social personality disorder. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.41, L.19 - p.42, L.3.) Both the prosecutor and defense counsel confirmed that, apart 
from the issues with the NCO, Mr. Peterson had been performing to expectations on his 
probation. 12 (Tr., Vol.1, p.54, Ls.15-17, p.55, Ls.22-23.) 
At the sentencing and disposition hearing, Mr. Peterson informed the district 
court that he had recently been determined to be fully disabled from employment and 
was eligible for social security and Medicaid assistance due to his mental health 
conditions. (Tr., Vol.1, p.60, L.18 - p.61, L.2.) The district court felt that this was a 
positive development as it would give Mr. Peterson more consistent access to 
necessary medications, which in turn, helped him to improve his performance on 
probation. (Tr., Vol.1, p.76, Ls.1-4, p.92, Ls.9 - p.93, L.8.) In fact, it stated that, but for 
those developments, it would have not continued Mr. Peterson on probation, but would 
have ordered him to serve his sentence in prison. (Tr., Vol.1, p.93, Ls.9-12.) 
Accordingly, the district court continued the probationary period in Docket Number 
7 
39146 and suspended the sentence it imposed in Docket Number 39147 based on the 
same terms and conditions. 13 (R., pp.142-43, 259-64.) Of particular note, the district 
court revoked all exceptions to the NCO, making it an absolute ban on contact between 
Mr. Peterson and Ms. Giannini again. (R., pp.142-43, 263.) 
Thereafter, Ms. Giannini went to Mr. Peterson's workplace, demanded to see 
him, and informed him that she had been raped while he had been in prison. 
(See, e.g., R., pp.186, 306.) Mr. Peterson was initially able to invoke the NCO and do 
what he could to abide by the terms thereof. ( See, e.g., R., pp.186, 306.) However, as 
he processed what Ms. Giannini had told him, he began to feel disgusted with himself 
for not being able to support her as she had supported him. 14 ( See, e.g., R., pp.186, 
306.) Ultimately, those emotions won out and he decided to provide that support by 
rekindling their relationship. (See, e.g., R., pp.186, 306.) The State filed new charges 
for violating the NCO over the ensuing communications between Mr. Peterson and 
Ms. Giannini, which were documented in telephone records presented to the district 
courts. (See Tr., Vol.5, p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.4.) 
That new charge also served as the basis for a new report of probation violation. 
(R., pp.171-74, 291-94.) The new charges (Docket Number 39783) were assigned to a 
different district court judge than the one presiding over Docket Numbers 39146 and 
39147. (R., Vol.1, pp.30, 247; R., Vol.2, p.23.) 
12 To that end, the prosecutor did not even object to Mr. Peterson's motion to reduce his 
bond. (Tr., Vol.1, p.56, Ls.3-9.) 
13 That sentence was for a unified five-year term, with three and one-half years fixed, 
and was concurrent to Docket Number 39146. (R., Vol.1, p.259-64.) 
14 Ms. Giannini, for example, had provided support for Mr. Peterson when he called her 
for help regarding a relapse he experienced during his recovery. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, 
p.20, L.18 - p.21, L.5.) 
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In regard to the probation violations in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147, 
Mr. Peterson agreed to admit two of the allegations, and the State agreed to dismiss the 
remainder. (Tr., Vol.4, p.5, Ls.11-20; Tr. Vol.4, p.17, Ls., 12-25.) All terms were left 
open for argument by both parties. (Tr., Vol.4, p.5, Ls.20-22.) At the disposition 
hearing, Mr. Peterson pointed out that the PSI focused on the uncharged malicious 
injury to property allegation rather than the violations of the NCO. 15 (Tr., Vol.1, p.109, 
Ls.7-17.) Defense counsel also pointed out that Ms. Giannini was a willing participant (if 
not the instigator) of these contacts. (Tr., Vol.1, p.110, Ls.16-19.) Defense counsel 
also recommended that, based on the evolution of Mr. Peterson's mental health 
conditions, and the impact they played on his continuing behavior, the district court 
consider recommending him to the mental health diversion court to try and provide 
additional help, support, and treatment options to continue his rehabilitation. (See 
Tr., Vol.1, p.115, Ls.5-24.) As an alternative, defense counsel recommended a new 
period of retained jurisdiction with a recommendation for the Therapeutic Community 
rider program. (Tr., Vol.1, p.116, Ls.10-18.) However, the district court pointed out that 
Mr. Peterson has had several prior opportunities to conform to the terms of probation, 
15 There was a report that a truck belonging to Ms. Shanta DeVilliers had been parked 
near Ms. Giannini's home in December 2010 and that it had been vandalized while 
there. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.4.) The motion for probation violation filed on March 16, 
2011, in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147 included a report that Mr. Peterson had 
committed the crime of malicious injury to property, and so had violated his probation. 
(R., Vol.1, p.292.) However, that allegation was never mentioned in the complaint or 
the information in Docket Number 39783. (See generally, R., Vol.2, pp.5-6, 26-27.) 
Furthermore, when Mr. Peterson agreed to admit two of the allegations (neither of which 
was the allegation regarding the malicious injury to property) the State agreed to 
dismiss the remaining allegations. (Tr., Vol.4, p.5, Ls.10-20; p.16, L 18 - p.17, L.25; 
see also R., Vol.1, p.292.) In response to Mr. Peterson's concern, the district court 
confirmed that Mr. Peterson had not actually been charged with malicious injury to 
property. (Tr., Vol.5, p.31, Ls.10-14.) 
9 
and so it executed the two sentences.16 (Tr., Vol.1, p.125, Ls.6-23.) It did recommend 
that Mr. Peterson be considered for both the Therapeutic Community program in the 
prison, as well as the mental health unit. (Tr., Vol.1, p.125, L.22, p.126, Ls.19-21; 
R., Vol.1, pp.195-97, 316-18.) 
Mr. Peterson appealed timely from the decision to revoke his probation. 
(R., Vol.1, pp.200-02, 321-23.) He also contemporaneously filed motions for 
reconsideration of his sentences pursuant to Rule 35. (R., Vol.1, pp.199, 320.) He 
filed a brief in support of that motion, to which various documents demonstrating 
completion of programming were attached. (R., Vol.1, pp.206-14, 327-35.) However, 
the district court stated that, since Mr. Peterson had been unable to succeed on 
probation in the past, he was unlikely to be able to succeed in the future, and thus, the 
need of society to protect itself from further violations of the NCO outweighed his 
unconvincing evidence of his rehabilitative potential. (R., Vol.1, pp.217-18, 338-39.) 
Accordingly, it denied his motions. (R., Vol.1, pp.215-18, 336-39.) 
As to the new charges in Docket Number 39783, Mr. Peterson agreed to plead 
guilty as charged and the State agreed to not file a persistent violator enhancement 
and to cap its recommendation at a unified five-year sentence, with four years fixed, 
concurrent with the other sentences. (Tr., Vol.5, p.1, Ls.8-15, p.7, Ls.1-15; see also 
Tr., Vol.5, p.28, Ls.2-9 (the district court reiterating the plea agreement on the record, 
indicating the recommendation was that this sentence be concurrent to both of the other 
sentences, a statement which drew no objection from either party).) Mr. Peterson also 
16 The district court did give him credit for time served - on Docket Number 39146 
(three years fixed, five total), it granted credit for nearly two years of time served 
(R., Vol.1, pp.195-96), and on Docket Number 39147 (three and one-half years fixed, 
five total), it granted credit for nearly one year of time served. (R., Vol.1, p.317.) 
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made some statements to the district court at that time. He confirmed that he rekindled 
his relationship with Ms. Giannini so as to be able to provide her with support, becoming 
so emotional in regard to these events that the district court was obliged to take a 
recess so that he could collect himself (Tr., Vol.5, p.22, L.14 - p.23, L.14, p.24, 
Ls.1-23.) He also informed the district court that the prison staff was not permitting him 
to take the anti-seizure medication prescribed by Dr. Gage. (Tr., Vol.5, p.4, Ls.7-12, 
p.5, Ls.2-9.) 
At the sentencing hearing in that case, Mr. Peterson articulated his concern that 
the PSI had focused on an allegation of malicious injury to property, a crime for which 
there is no evidence that he had ever been charged, much less convicted, as well as 
the apparent lack of evidence regarding the records of his telephonic communications 
with Ms. Giannini. (Tr., Vol.5, p.31, Ls.4-12.) The district court reassured Mr. Peterson 
that it would not be considering the malicious injury allegation as it had not been 
charged against him, and that it had received the relevant telephone records with the 
PSI and had reviewed those records. (Tr., Vol.5, p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.14.) Mr. Peterson 
indicated that he was satisfied with that reassurance. (Tr., p.32, Ls.15-16.) 
Defense counsel also pointed out that Ms. Giannini, not Mr. Peterson, was 
usually the instigating party in this as well as the prior incidents, and that apart from 
Ms. Giannini's interference, Mr. Peterson actually presents as a likely candidate for 
rehabilitation otherwise. (Tr., Vol.5, p.37, L.14 - p.39, L.3.) As a result, he 
recommended that the sentence be a unified five-year sentence, but with only one year 
fixed, and that it be concurrent to the other two sentences. (Tr., Vol.5, p.39, Ls.4-7.) 
Mr. Peterson recounted these facts and requested that, if the district court did not 
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accept his attorney's recommendation, that it not impose a fixed term beyond two and 
one-half years. 17 (Tr., Vol.5, p.41, Ls.19-25.) 
The district court, however, pointed to the "disturbing pattern of violating these 
court orders," as an aggravating factor which it was considering. (Tr., Vol.5, p.44, 
Ls.9-10.) It then recounted the various mitigating factors in Mr. Peterson's case, 
dwelling particularly on Ms. Giannini's complicity in the contacts and the fact that the 
contacts were not "bad" or otherwise unwelcome. (Tr., Vol.5, p.44, L.19 - p.45, L.23.) 
In that regard, it reviewed a multitude of telephone records: 
Those phone records show that between June of 2010 and January 
of 2011, they were able to document some 1,386 phone calls from you to 
the victim in violation of your no contact order. 
Those phone records also indicated that on that same date --
between those same dates, they were able to document 1,899 text 
messages between you and the victim of the no contact order. Those 
materials are within the presentence materials that I've reviewed, sir. 18 
(Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.6-14.) As a result of the district court's consideration of that 
evidence, it imposed a unified sentence of five years, with only one and one-half years 
fixed, but it did impose that sentence consecutive to the other two sentences. 
(R., Vol.2, pp.56; Tr., p.46, Ls.14-20.) 
Mr. Peterson attempted to appeal against that new sentence, but that appeal was 
dismissed as untimely. (See Docket Number 39679.) He did, however, file a timely 
17 Calculating in the ordered credit for time served, that is approximately the same 
amount of time that remained in the fixed portions of his other two sentences. (See, 
R., Vol.1, pp.195-96, 317.) 
18 As those telephone records were attached to the PSI information presented to the 
district court in Docket Number 39783 (Tr., Vol.5, p. p.32, Ls.13-14), they would have 
also been provided to the district court in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147 because, 
as that district court stated, "I also have ... the updated presentence report prepared 
for [Docket Number 39783] and the attached materials related to those presentence 
materials." {Tr., Vol.1, p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.4.) As such, both district court records 
should have included a copy of those documents. 
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Rule 35 motion requesting leniency in that case. (R., Vol.2, p.60.) He filed an 
addendum to which he attached a letter written by him, requesting the district court at 
least make his sentence in Docket Number 39783 concurrent to the other two 
sentences in recognition of the mutuality of the contacts. (R., Vol.2, pp.63-64.) 
Otherwise he requested his sentence be reduced to a unified term of five years with 
zero fixed. 19 (R., Vol.2, pp.63-64.) The district court denied that motion, holding that 
the evidence of Mr. Peterson's programming efforts and positive performance in prison 
did not justify a more lenient sentence in light of his history of disregard for the NCO, 
nor did the district court find it illustrative of how Mr. Peterson would perform in a 
non-custodial setting. (R., Vol.2, pp.71-72.) Mr. Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal 
from the denial of his Rule 35 motion in that case. (R., pp.74-76.) 
Thereafter, he moved that these three cases be consolidated due to the fact that 
they all shared the same core facts and would raise similar issues on appeal. (Motion 
to Consolidate, filed July 5, 2012.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted that order. 
(Order Granting Motion to Consolidate, filed July 11, 2012.) However, the telephone 
records reviewed by the district court (see Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.6-14) were not included 
with any of the PSI materials provided with the appellate record. (See generally PSI, 
Vol.1; PSI, Vol.2) Mr. Peterson filed a Motion to Augment the record with those 
documents. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement 
in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment Telephone Records), filed July 5, 
2012, pp.1-2.) The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately denied that motion because "this 
Court has been advised by the district court that there are no records of the defendant's 
19 He and his attorney recommended at sentencing that the fixed term should be one 
year, but should not exceed two and one-half years. (Tr., Vol.5, p.39, Ls.4-7, p.41, 
Ls.19-25.) 
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telephone and texting communications." (Order Denying Motion to Augment and To 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Telephone Records, filed 
July 23, 2012.) Mr. Peterson was given thirty-five days from that date to file his brief. 
(Order Denying Telephone Records.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Peterson's state and federal constitutional 
rights to due process by failing to maintain an accurate copy of the record in his 
case. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Peterson's 
probation in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147, or, by not reducing his 
sentences sua sponte pursuant to Rule 35. 
3. Whether either or both of the district courts abused their discretion when they 
denied Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 motions. 
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ARGUMEI\JT 
I. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Peterson's State And Federal Constitutional Rights To 
Due Process By Failing To Maintain An Accurate Copy Of The Record In His Case 
A. Introduction 
Both the Idaho and federal constitutions guarantees the defendant in a criminal 
case due process of law. Part of that due process right is to be afforded access to an 
adequate record on appeal. All the information upon which the district court relied in 
making the decision challenged on appeal needs to be included in the appellate record, 
otherwise the appellate record is inadequate. By not maintaining a copy of the 
telephone records upon which it expressly relied, the district courts deprived 
Mr. Peterson of his due process protections to an adequate appellate record. Such a 
deprivation necessitates a remedy on appeal, specifically a new sentencing and 
disposition hearing before a new judge. This Court should afford that remedy. 
B. By Not Preserving A Sufficient Record For Appeal, The District Court Violated 
Mr. Peterson's Due Process Rights 
Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant due 
process and equal protection of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I § 13. 
One aspect of those protections is that the defendant has a right to "'a record on appeal 
that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below."' State v. Morgan, __ P.3d __ , Docket No. 39057, at 2 
(Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002)), petition for rev. 
filed. It is untenable for the courts to deprive a defendant-appellant from receiving an 
adequate appellate review by depriving him of a sufficient appellate record. 
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Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963); see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 
(1956). 
This is particularly important because of the presumption established in Idaho 
regarding missing portions of the record: "[AJn appellant bears the burden to provide an 
adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of 
error ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are 
presumed to support the actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 
(Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). Mr. Peterson has taken all reasonable steps to meet 
this obligation, yet, due to circumstances entirely beyond his control, relevant portions of 
the record are unavailable to him, specifically, information which was used as an 
aggravating factor. Thus, the record is insufficient. 
Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the culpability lies with the 
district court: "this Court has been advised by the district court that there are no records 
of the defendant's telephone and texting communications."20 (Order Denying 
Telephone Records.) The ultimate conclusion is that, due to the district courts' failure to 
preserve copies of the documents attached to the PSI, Mr. Peterson was denied access 
to a sufficient appellate record in contravention of his state and federal appellate rights. 
See, e.g., Morgan, Docket Number 39057, at p.2. 
As the error is clear based on the record that was provided, the next question 
regards the appropriate remedy. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, where a 
sufficient record is unavailable, "but had a record been available it might have 
substantiated the defendant's allegation that there was prejudicial error in those 
20 Since the district courts obviously had those records, the fact that they do not exist 
must be attributed to the district courts. ( See Tr., Vol.1, p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.4; 
Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.6-14.) 
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proceedings," the judgment of conviction based on the missing portions of the record 
cannot stand. State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 51 (1990) (emphasis added). This is 
particularly true when the insufficiency is due to factors beyond the defendant's control. 
See State v. Martinez, 92 Idaho 148, 149-50 (1968). 
For example, where a juvenile defendant was deprived of an adequate appellate 
record due to the district court's failure to make or preserve either the recording or 
minutes of a hearing, the Idaho Supreme Court ordered: "The judgment is reversed and 
the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to enter an order directing the 
warden of the State Penitentiary to release and discharge appellant, unless the 
prosecuting attorney of Jefferson County obtains a bench warrant for the further 
prosecution of appellant prior to remittitur herein." Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 630, 636 
(1967). The Court found that this remedy was appropriate since the error was not of the 
defendant's making and the district court had failed to comply with the relevant statute. 
Id. In doing so, the district court had deprived the defendant of the fundamental fairness 
necessary to state and federal due process.21 Id. 
Essentially, when the defendant is deprived of the opportunity to establish the 
facts of his case as he challenges the legality of the decision to incarcerate him, 
particularly when the deprivation is due to no fault of his, the deprivation of the due 
process rights is clear. Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50. This principle has been extended 
to situations where an affidavit in support of a search warrant is not included in the 
record. See State v. Zielinski, 119 Idaho 316, 318 (1991). In that case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that at a subsequent "reconstruction hearing," the trial court could 
21 However, not every failure in that regard constituted a deprivation of due process. 
See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 231 (1975). 
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not rely on that affidavit, the warrant was invalid, and thus, it upheld the dismissal of the 
complaint. Id. 
Therefore, in this case, where Mr. Peterson pied guilty to the offenses, the 
conviction itself does not appear to be problematically-based on the missing documents. 
Compare Walters, 120 Idaho at 51; Zielinski, 119 Idaho at 318. Nevertheless, there has 
been a violation of his due process rights, and so he should be afforded a remedy. 
See Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50. Therefore, based on the rule set forth in Ebersole, 
Mr. Peterson requests an order for his release unless the State pursues a new 
sentencing hearing and a new disposition hearing before a different judge, wherein the 
evidence relied upon to justify the resulting sentencing determination is preserved for 
appellate review. See Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636. 
11. 
The District Court In Docket Numbers 39146 And 39147 Abused Its Discretion By 
Revoking Mr. Peterson's Probation, Or, By I\Jot Reducing His Sentences Sua Sponte 
Pursuant To Rule 35 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Peterson contends that, in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147, the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or alternatively, when it failed 
to reduce his sentences sua sponte pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. He alleges that 
the abuse occurred because the district court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating 
factors in this case, notably, the fact that Ms. Giannini was either a willing participant or 
the instigator of the contacts, and that he had been able to perform satisfactorily in all 
other regards of his probation. As such, he contends that the district court could not 
reasonably conclude that probation was inappropriate in this case. As a result, its 
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decision to revoke probation and order his incarceration constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. The District Court In Docket Nos. 39146 And 39147 Abused Its Discretion When 
It Revoked Mr. Peterson's Probation 
Mr. Peterson asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke 
probation and execute his concurrent unified sentences of five years, with three years 
fixed, and five years with three and one-half years fixed, was an abuse of the district 
court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is within the district court's 
discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). The district court 
must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and 
whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection of society." Id. 
The Legislature has established the criteria for determining whether probation or 
incarceration is merited. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing I.C. § 19-
2521 ). In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered inquiry, 
determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and 
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Chavez, 134 
Idaho at 312-13 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). Accordingly, in 
order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Peterson must show that, in light of the 
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. See 
id. at 312. 
In order to satisfy this standard, the district court needed to sufficiently 
consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the 
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record. See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Those sentencing 
objectives are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). The protection of society is 
the primary objective the court should consider. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives 
will be considered reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 568 (Ct. App. 1982). 
This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, 
and as a result, each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether 
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served 
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They 
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time 
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of 
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more 
lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, several of those 
factors are present, but were insufficiently considered by the district court as it crafted 
its disposition in regard to Mr. Peterson. As a result, it did not sufficiently consider 
whether Mr. Peterson's probation was adequately serving the goal of rehabilitation or 
whether society required protection from Mr. Peterson through incarceration. 
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See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312. Therefore, this disposition constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
First, the Idaho Supreme Court has also recently recognized that I.C. § 19-2523 
requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental health condition as a sentencing 
factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). The record is replete with evidence 
of Mr. Peterson's mental health issues and their effect on him. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, 
pp.339, 448-57.) These issues played a major role in Mr. Peterson's decisions after 
Ms. Giannini reinitiated contact. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.18; R., pp.186, 306 
(recounting his reaction to and rationalization regarding Ms. Giannini's statements).) 
Since those conditions had a major effect on his reaction to her reinitiation of their 
relationship, his mental conditions needed to be sufficiently considered, and failing to do 
so constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Additionally, acknowledgment of guilt and thus, acceptance of responsibility, by 
the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 
812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010). Mr. Peterson continues to recognize and accept his 
responsibility in regard to his actions. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol. 1, p.31 O; PSI, Vol.2, p.129; 
Tr., Vol.1, p.78, L.24; Tr., Vol.5, p.39, Ls.13-15, p.41, Ls.15-18) He has also expressed 
his sincere remorse for his failures in this regard. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol.1, p.18, Ls.19-24.) 
These two acknowledgements by Mr. Peterson demonstrate that he has taken these 
critical first steps, and as such, those first steps needed to be sufficiently considered by 
the district court. 
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In addition, Ms. Giannini's behavior should not be overlooked.22 She was 
the party who reinitiated contact by threatening to make a scene at Mr. Peterson's 
workplace. (See, e.g., R., pp.186, 306.) Mr. Peterson was able to respond 
appropriately, reminding her of the NCO and ending the contact. (See, e.g., R., pp.186, 
306.) That demonstrates an ability to adhere to the terms of probation if given a little 
more power (for example, by making the NCO mutual). In addition, that is a factor the 
Legislature has identified as indicating imprisonment is an improper result. I.C. § 19-
2521 {2)(c)-(e) (providing that where the victim induced or facilitated the crime, or that 
where the defendant acted under provocation or had some other imperfect defense to 
the crime, those factors should be considered as weighing against the need to 
incarcerate that defendant). In addition, Ms. Giannini was a willing participant and was 
not afraid of Mr. Peterson during that time. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.110, Ls.18-19; PSI, 
Vol.2, p.18 {Ms. Giannini explaining to officers that she did not call the authorities during 
the initial contacts, even though there was the NCO, suggesting that she was not afraid 
during that time, despite the contacts).) And because Mr. Peterson's actions did not 
contemplate or cause harm, those are two more reasons the Legislature has said that 
incarceration is an inappropriate result. I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(a)-(b). 
22 In fact, Ms. Giannini has demonstrated her desire to have control over Mr. Peterson. 
When she was asked by officers about the vandalism to Ms. DeVilliers's truck (see 
footnote 14, supra), she told them that Mr. Peterson was jealously possessive of her 
and that he was causing problems for her. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.18.) She revealed 
that there was a no contact order and accused him of breaking it (without informing the 
officers that it was she who had reinitiated the contact). (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.18.) 
Ultimately, she told police that she believed Mr. Peterson had vandalized the vehicle 
without any basis for that assumption other than the fact that police were asking about 
him in possible connection to the event. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.19.) Yet she went on 
to recant that statement, and in doing so, was able to portray herself as Mr. Peterson's 
ally. (See, e.g.l PSI, Vol.2, p.29.) As defense counsel summarized, it appears that "she 
did try to put him in a position where he would violate the no-contact order. ... there is 
some mitigation here." {Tr., p.111, Ls.1-5.) 
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In addition, Mr. Peterson has been able to perform well in the other aspects of his 
probation. And, he has the ongoing support of his family, friends, and employers. 
(See PSI, Vol.2, pp.428-29, 432, 481, 483, 534.) The most telling evidence of this 
strong support network was revealed by the ALJ, who noted that Mr. Peterson's 
employer was understanding of his condition, and as such, gave Mr. Peterson a lot of 
leeway in the workplace. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.347.) In fact, his employer is willing 
to continue employing Mr. Peterson when he is ultimately released. (See, e.g., PSI, 
Vol.1, p.9.) This demonstrates a commitment by members of his community to help 
IVlr. Peterson succeed. A strong support network is a factor that should be considered 
in terms of rehabilitation. See Ke//is, 148 Idaho 812 (holding that familial support 
offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in 
consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for 
rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a suspended sentence, 
which provides for continued rehabilitation, still addresses all the other objectives -
protection of society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 
703, 713 (1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing 
objectives). When a sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still 
imposes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the 
imposed sentence are still present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 
(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the 
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those 
objectives). Furthermore, the district court retains the ability to revoke the probation and 
execute the original sentence if Mr. Peterson were to fail to continue his rehabilitative 
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efforts probation. However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives 
would be properly addressed. What the probationary period provides that a term 
sentence does not is the opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing 
Mr. Peterson to apply the lessons he would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical 
setting. 
C. Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua 
Sponte Reduce Mr. Peterson's Sentences Pursuant To Rule 35 
Even if the district court still properly determined that incarceration was 
necessary, it should have reduced Mr. Peterson's sentences sua sponte pursuant to 
Rule 35. See, e.g., State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008). The decision to not 
reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on appeal if it constitutes an 
abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 
2009); abrogated on other grounds by State v. Morgan, P. 3d _, Docket No. 
39057 (Ct App. 2012), petition for rev. filed. The standard of review and factors 
considered in such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. 
Id. (citing among others, Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568). Therefore, the district court needed 
to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating 
factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should 
result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595. 
Therefore, for the reasons articulated in Section ll(B) supra, the district court 
should have at least reduced the sentences in order to allow Mr. Peterson the 
opportunity to more quickly return to his support network where he would be able to 
continue rehabilitating and contributing to society. 
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111. 
Either Or Both Of The District Courts Abused Their Discretion When They Denied 
Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 Motions 
A Introduction 
All three of Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 motions made essentially the same request 
for leniency based on his contention that the sentences imposed are excessive. 
Furthermore, both district courts gave essentially the same reason for their denials of 
those motions: Mr. Peterson had been given several opportunities at probation and had 
continued to violate the terms thereof. However, the new information provided to the 
district courts demonstrate that he had been fairly successful in adhering to all the other 
terms of his probation, which, when combined with a sufficient consideration of all the 
factors, reveals that he is still a good candidate for probation. As such the district 
courts' decisions to deny the Rule 35 motions were abuses of discretion. 
B. The District Court in Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147 Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 Motions 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed 
to the sound discretion of tl1e sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). When petitioning for a sentence 
reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. 'The criteria 
for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider 
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the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were 
altered by the new evidence Mr. Peterson presented. See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at 
203. A failure to do so should result in a more lenient sentence. See e.g., Cook, 145 
Idaho at 489-90; Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55; Shideler, 
103 Idaho at 595. 
Mr. Peterson presented the district court with documentation of his ability to 
succeed in rehabilitative programming and be a productive member of his community. 
(See R., Vol.1, pp.331-35.) Because that was the case, and because any additional 
treatment necessary could be obtained through the Therapeutic Community rider 
program (see, e.g., R., Vol.1, p.328), the decision to deny the Rule 35 motion forces the 
prison system to continue detaining Mr. Peterson, when better treatment options were 
available without incarceration, which runs contrary to yet another of the Legislature's 
recommendations. See I.C. § 19-2521 (1 )(b). Furthermore, sentences are to be crafted 
so that they do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person once 
rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; 
State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). By foregoing that rehabilitative 
opportunity, the decision to deny the Rule 35 motion operates contrary to the 
admonitions from Cook and Eubank. The fact that Mr. Peterson had previous 
opportunities for probation alone does not mean that continued probation, or a period of 
retained jurisdiction, is still not the best option to promote rehabilitation (and as a result, 
long-term protection of society). See Me,win, 131 Idaho at 648 (identifying I.C. § 19-
2521 as the proper standard for determining whether probation is appropriate in a given 
case); I.C. § 19-2521 (not establishing that the fact that a defendant has had prior 
rehabilitative opportunities should be a factor indicating incarceration is appropriate). 
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As such, the district court's articulated reason for denying the Rule 35 motion is 
insufficient to justify its decision. (See R., Vol.1, pp.338-39.) In fact, as described 
supra, many of the factors identified by the Legislature actually indicate that 
Mr. Peterson should have remained on probation. See I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(a)-(e). 
Therefore, this new evidence, in addition to the insu'fficiently-considered 
mitigating factors discussed in Section ll(B)-(C), supra, demonstrates that the district 
court's decision to deny Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 motions constituted an abuse of 
discretion. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
C. The District Court in Docket No. 39783 Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 Motion 
The district court in this case denied the Rule 35 motion for reasons similar to 
those articulated by the district court in Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147. (R., Vol.2, 
pp.69-72; compare R., Vol.1, pp.215-18; 336-39.) Therefore, for reasons similar to 
those discussed in Section 11 l(B), supra, its decision also constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
However, it also concluded that the new evidence Mr. Peterson presented 
(namely, ~1is successful efforts to program since being incarcerated) were not indicative 
of how he would perform in a less-structured and less-supervised setting. (R., Vol.2, 
p.72.) In reaching that conclusion, it essentially ignored the other evidence in the 
record, which indicated that the performance in prison was not an aberration, and that 
would continue such behavior in the less-supervised setting. For example, 
Mr. Peterson was able to maintain a clean and sober residence, maintain employment 
(despite being fully disabled), and maintain his programming. (PSI, Vol.2, p.107.) As 
such, the district court failed to sufficiently consider the new evidence in light of all the 
28 
other evidence from the prior instances, and as such, abused its discretion. See, e.g., 
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 2th day of August, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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